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Abstract
This paper develops a method to measure difficulties in market access over a large
set of countries (both developing and developed) and industries, during the period
1980-2006. We use a micro-founded heterogeneous-consumers model to estimate the
impact of national borders on global and regional trade flows. Results show that
difficulties faced by developing countries’ exporters in accessing developed markets are
50% higher than those faced by Northern exporters. These international fragmentations
have however experienced a noticeable fall since 1980 in both Southern and Northern
markets, and in all industries. It is twenty three times easier to enter those markets for a
Southern country exporter in 2006 than in 1980. While tariffs still have an influence on
trade patterns, they do not seem to explain an important part of the border effect. Last,
our theory-based measure offers a renewal of the assessment of the impact of regional
trading arrangements. The EU, NAFTA, ASEAN and MERCOSUR agreements all
tend to reduce the estimated degree of market fragmentation within those zones, with
the expected ranking between their respective trade impact.
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1 Introduction
“There is a wide agreement that the space-economy may be viewed as the out-
come of a trade-off between different types of scale economies in production and
the mobility costs of goods, people and information.”, Thisse (2012).
The present paper is a contribution to the measurement of the second part of the trade-
off emphasized by Jacques Thisse in the quoted paper, a chapter surveying the history of
thought of spatial economics. More precisely, we focus on measuring the level and recent
evolution of how goods move across space, and in particular how impeded they are by
national borders even in the modern era which seems characterized by a fall of all kinds of
transaction costs. If the existence of trade costs seems essential to any economic theory that
claims to be “spatial”, their actual level is also crucially important. The extent of market
integration (or dis-integration) is central in particular when the theory tries to assess the level
of geographical disparity in economic activity. This is true for the Krugman-type models of
course, but a larger class of mechanisms predicts that the organization of the world economy
will move through a bell shape curve of dispersion-agglomeration-dispersion as trade costs
fall. This pattern has consequences in terms of income disparities, the agglomeration phase
being one where the manufacturing economic activity concentrates in a rich core, which
diverges from an impoverished periphery. Then, the final dispersion phase that comes with
low trade costs ends up enabling peripheral countries to catch up with the industrialized
world.1 Knowing “where in the bell” is the world economy is therefore quite important to
predict what comes next, should we continue to integrate markets further.
Measuring market integration is also a way to measure market access. This can be useful
in the debate opposing industrialized and developing economies regarding their respective
contribution to the multilateral liberalization of trade flows. Particularly, in the current
context of WTO negotiations seemingly stalled, and rising protectionist pressures (since the
crisis), a rigorous measure of market access difficulties, encountered by different exporters,
can contribute to the policy debate. A good illustration is the case of Least Developed
Countries (LDCs), on which current WTO talks are largely focused.2 Despite complex
and wide-ranging preferential access granted by rich countries to exporters of the poorest
developing economies, there are claims that their market access remains limited. Claims
from LDCs are seemingly backed up by the apparently low level of their market shares in
rich countries. The share of LDCs in total imports of the most developed countries is rarely
above a tiny 1%. As an example, their import share in the European Union (EU) market
was about 0.4% in 1990, 0.5% in 2000 and 0.55% in 2006. The evolution of both the total
and manufacturing import shares of the 50 LDCs, between 1989 and 2006, in the EU, the
USA and the Japan markets gives credits to the Southern’s claims (see figures in appendix
A).3 Such tiny shares are even more problematic since market access appears to be a major
1The first paper emphasizing the bell shape curve (Krugman and Venables, 1995) was titled “Globalization
and the Inequality of Nations”.
2Multilateral negotiations on the issue of manufacturing tariffs seem to show no sign of progress. As a
consequence, talks could be reoriented on a minimal objective for the Doha Round: to improve the market
access at least for exporters from LDCs.
3We use BACI, the Gaulier and Zignago (2010) database of international trade, to compute the annual
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determinant for economic development (see for instance Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 2010,
for a recent contribution using a clever identification strategy to derive causal estimates).
However instructive, this type of figures cannot be sufficient to draw conclusions on the
level of market access experienced by Southern exporters on Northern markets. The first
limitation is that we do not know a priori what to compare those numbers to. Any assessment
of market access based on trade flows needs to specify a benchmark of trade patterns, to
which actual international exchanges of goods will be compared. Such a benchmark can only
be provided by theory. We use here a theoretical framework to give an empirically estimable
Gravity-type equation. The theoretical framework is derived from a logit demand system,
described in Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992), and a typical monopolistic competition
market structure. Difficulties in market access are measured as a (negative) deviation from
this theoretical benchmark. We therefore rely on an indirect measure of protection. Market
access difficulties are revealed by distortions in trade flows, after having controlled for supply
and demand capacity, and bilateral frictions as dictated by the theoretical framework.4
A second problematic issue with the use of the simple market shares to assess market
access is that they usually miss most of the action. When saying that in 2006, the EU
countries had on average 0.55% of their imports originating from LDCs, one is in fact only
comparing relative access among foreign producers on the EU market. The problem is that,
for most products, the large majority of overall demand in a country is met by domestic
producers, not foreign. A more sensible index of market access must take into account the
market share of foreign producers in the overall demand. This is what the border effect
method does. It considers trade flows within countries as well as among countries and
compares imports from foreign countries to “imports” from domestic producers. This gives
a benchmark based on a situation of the best possible market access, the one faced by
domestic producers.
We follow this method of market integration measurement and expand it so that it
provides new results on access difficulties of world markets, distinguishing between rich,
emerging and LDC’s exporters, over the period 1980-2006. This is made possible by the con-
struction and use of large interconnected datasets. Firstly, the collection of production and
trade data is an updated extension of Nicita and Olarreaga (2007), aiming to cover more
countries and years. Secondly, a specific feature of our study is to identify in the border
effect measurement of market access, the part to be associated with observed bilateral char-
acteristics, such as tariffs. In particular, we compute bilateral distances (both internal and
international) such that they take into account the geographic distribution of the economic
activity inside each nation, in order to avoid mis-measurement in relative distances.
Results show that difficulties faced by developing countries’ exporters in accessing de-
veloped markets are substantial and higher than those faced by Northern exporters. This
measure of international fragmentation has however experienced a noticeable fall since 1980
in both Southern and Northern markets, and in all industries. It is twenty three times easier
import shares of the LDCs. The EU market is composed of the first 15 EU members. The 50 LDCs are
retained according to the UNCTAD’s list (as for 2006).
4Alternatively, one can try to measure protection directly through the collection of formal trade barriers.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) survey both types of works, using direct and indirect protection measures
respectively.
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to enter those markets for a Southern country exporter in 2006 than in 1980. While tariffs
still have an influence on trade patterns, they do not seem to explain an important part
of the border effect. Controlling for tariffs, the tariff equivalent of the world fragmentation
level is still 233%. A “by-product” of the method is the provision of new estimates of the
impact of Regional Trading Arrangements (RTAs), both involving Northern and Southern
countries’ combinations, on trade patterns. The benchmark against which trade patterns
inside the RTA are compared is the domestic market, supposedly highly integrated.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we motivate the use of the border
effects methodology when measuring market access. In section 3, we specify the theoretical
foundations of our work as well as the derived empirical specification. In section 4, we
expose the data requirements. In section 5, we provide results for overall market access to
Northern and Southern producers and for the impact of regional trade agreements and give
details concerning the evolution of this access over recent years as well as differences across
industries.
2 Measuring international market openness with bor-
der effects
Why do we need to study the impact of national borders on trade flows? The reason lies
in the fact that international trade flows are not sufficient to gauge international markets
integration. This statement is based on the simple idea that two countries could be considered
perfectly integrated if the national border separating them had no specific impact on where
consumers choose to source their purchases and where producers can sell their output. In
fact, in the European Union, this is best summarized as the whole idea of the Single Market,
which explicitly states its goal to be the abolition of the economic significance of national
borders. The title of an official document of the European Commission (2003) makes it
extremely clear: The Internal Market – Ten Years Without Frontiers.5
The measure of the degree of international market fragmentation is therefore linked to
the assessment of the impact of national borders. In order to make that assessment, one
needs to consider international trade flows as well as intra-national trade flows and compare
the two. This comparison is best understood with a model of bilateral trade, that compares
trade between two national locations with trade of two comparable international locations.
This model allows thus to derive what a “normal” bilateral trade flow should be. The
gravity equation is the ideal candidate for this derivation thanks to its old empirical success
in describing bilateral trade flows. This methodology of mixing inter- and intra-national
trade flows in order to measure the impact of national borders was the motivation behind
the seminal work of McCallum (1995). Wei (1996) extended this methodology for the cases
where intra-national trade is not available. Indeed, even in the absence of explicit intra-
national flows, we can still measure the total volume of trade occurring within a country.
For a given industry and year, this is simply equal to the overall production of the country
minus its total exports, which gives the value of goods shipped from a country to its own
5Available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/10years/docs/workingdoc/workingdoc_en.
pdf
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consumers. This observation can then be inserted in a bilateral trade equation. This is the
way we proceed here. Our framework also incorporates recent advances in the modeling of
gravity equations, turning back to trade theory to guide the empirical specification (examples
and surveys of those approaches include Feenstra, 2004, and Anderson, 2011).
The border effects methodology has important advantages in the study of market in-
tegration. First, it offers a more intuitive benchmark of integration than the traditional
gravity equation framework. Take as an example the attempts to measure the impact of EU
membership on trade flows (Aitken, 1973 is one of the first such study, followed by Frankel,
1997, Frankel et al., 1995, and Soloaga and Winters, 2001). The literature seeks to find a
positive deviation of internal EU trade compared to a benchmark, which is usually trade
among OECD countries. It seems however far more reasonable to inverse this logic and look
for negative deviations from what would be a perfectly integrated zone: A nation.
Second, for a lot of issues, the border effect measure is also a useful methodology because
it captures all impediments to trade related to the existence of national borders, through
their impact on trade flows. Most of those impediments are hard to measure individually
(one only needs to consider the poverty of available statistics on non-tariff barriers even
inside the European Community at the launching of the Single Market Programme). The
global image is therefore useful. Related is the fact that if impediments rise because of
deliberate trade policy changes, there will usually be a strong will of countries to hide this
behavior by using sophisticated non-tariff barriers schemes6 that are very hard to detect for
the economist.
Last, border effects are more informative in the study of the evolution of trade barriers.
In a traditional gravity equation, using for instance a dummy variable for trade taking place
inside the EU, how should we interpret a rise in the coefficient on this dummy variable? Using
the traditional Vinerian interpretation of regional integration, this rise can first come from
consumers in EU countries substituting domestic goods in favor of foreign, but European,
goods (trade creation). The rise can however also come from substitution among imported
goods, in favor of EU producers and reducing imports from third countries (trade diversion).
The gravity equation in its most traditional form find it hard to differentiate among the two
causes (even if more elaborated forms like Fukao et al., 2003, or Carre`re, 2006, have made
progress possible in that direction). In contrast, the border effects methodology enables
to track a potential fall in the surplus of trade taking place inside countries, and therefore
separate trade creation from trade diversion effect.7
We will therefore use the border effects methodology, combining international and intra-
national trade flows in a gravity-type equation. The precise specification of this equation
stays however to be described, and this requires the presentation of our theoretical model,
to which we know turn.
6If only because all rules of multilateral agreements signed by countries belonging to regional integration
arrangements stipulate that regional blocks should not raise their external level of protection.
7Romalis (2007) provides an intermediate approach, where a bilateral trade equation of US imports is
first run, and US imports from self are then used to compute trade diversion effects of NAFTA and CUSFTA.
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3 The model and estimable equation
There are several theoretical foundations to the gravity equation.8 We will work here with a
specific form of a gravity equation to get a simple structure on which to base our statistical
analysis. The ingredients are as follows. The demand side is inspired by the logit demand
system described in Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992), and connected to gravity in
Head and Mayer (2011). The supply side follows the characteristics of a typical Krugman
(1980) monopolistic competition model.
Consider a multi-country framework where i, j, h = 1, ..., C denotes countries. Each
exporting country i produces Ni different varieties of a good.
9 The derivation of the gravity
equation comes from the allocation of total expenditure of the importing country j (Xj)
across the C origin countries. Based on the importing country budget allocation, we define
bilateral exports from country i to country j, Xij, as
Xij ≡ ΠijXj, (1)
where Πij is the share of expenditures allocated to country i, with
∑C
i=1 Πij = 1 and∑C
i=1Xij = Xj. We specify the share Πij by resorting to discrete choice theory (see Ander-
son, de Palma and Thisse, 1992).10 We assume that Πij depends on the probability Pij that
each of the Lj heterogeneous consumers in j chooses one of the Ni varieties. Then, each
consumer consumes a quantity qij of the chosen variety and spends an amount Xj/Lj on it.
The utility function associated with the consumption of the chosen variety is given by
uij = ln[qijij], (2)
where ij is the unobserved taste variation of consumers in country j for product varieties
from country i. The heterogeneity, represented by ln ij, is assumed to be distributed accord-
ing to the type I extreme value distribution, known as Gumbel, with location parameter zero
and scale parameter θ. This has the cumulative distribution function exp{− exp(−θ(ln ij))},
where θ is an inverse measure of the degree of dispersion of consumers’ preferences.
To specify the probability Pij, we assume that each consumer in j compares the utility
of the varieties imported from all countries C. Then, she selects the variety giving her the
highest utility. The corresponding indirect utility is given by vij = ln(Xj/Lj)− ln pij + ln ij,
since the individual demand is qij = Xj/(Ljpij) for the selected variety and zero on all other
varieties. pij is the price consumers in country j face for products from country i.
8Anderson (1979) probably provides the earliest derivation of the gravity equation based on the Armington
assumption that goods are differentiated by country of origin. Evenett and Keller (2003) show that a
theoretical prediction of the gravity will arise in virtually all trade models with complete specialization.
Feenstra (2004) provides a description of the link between the gravity equation and bilateral trade patterns
in a monopolistic competition framework. See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Eaton and Kortum
(2002), and Chaney (2008) for three theoretical foundations of the gravity equation relying on very different
assumptions, and Head and Mayer (2011) for a general treatment.
9We present here a gravity equation at the aggregate level. However, the notation and logic of the gravity
model also readily apply to disaggregated k goods and disaggregation of countries into regions (see Anderson,
2011).
10Head and Ries (2008) and de Sousa and Lochard (2011) use a similar strategy to model bilateral for-
eign direct investments. Eaton and Kortum (2002) use a related strategy for trade decisions by modeling
heterogeneous industries.
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Selecting the variety with the highest utility amounts to choosing a variety in country
i such that max vij > max vhj for all country h 6= i. This choice is associated with the
distribution of ij. The Gumbel features an important reproductive property for its own
maximum sample extreme. It is a max-stable distribution. That is, the distribution of the
maximum of ij, drawn from the number of product varieties Ni, is again Gumbel with the
same inverse shape parameter, θ, but shifted up by (1/θ) lnNi. This implies a multinomial
logit form for the probabilities of consumers in country j choosing one of the Ni varieties
made in country i:
Pij =
exp[lnNi − θ ln pij]∑
h exp[lnNh − θ ln phj]
=
Nip
−θ
ij∑
hNhp
−θ
hj
. (3)
The derived probability Pij allows to determine the share Πij of expenditures allocated to
country i, and, consequently, to quantify the exports from i to j (Xij). With large numbers
of consumers and varieties, the share Πij will equal the probability Pij. Substituting (3) in
(1) we obtain
Xij ≡ ΠijXj = Ni(piτij)−θΦ−1j Xj, (4)
where pij = piτij, with pi the ‘factory gate’ price and τij ≥ 1 the iceberg-type trade costs
(i.e. the units of the product that must be shipped to j in order one for unit to arrive); Φj =∑
hNh(phτhj)
−θ is a term equivalent to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)’s “multilateral
resistance index” of country j. Taking the ratio of Xij over Xjj, country j’s exports to itself,
the Φj term then drops and we are left with relative numbers of firms, relative costs in i and
j, and relative bilateral trade costs:
Xij
Xjj
=
Ni
Nj
(
pi
pj
)−θ (
τij
τjj
)−θ
. (5)
The key difference of this model compared with Dixit-Stigliz-Krugman (see Feenstra, 2004)
or Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) lies in −θ, which substitutes for −(σ − 1) as the
price elasticity of trade flows. An increase in the elasticity of substitution (σ) means that
products are becoming more homogeneous, and an increase in θ means that consumers are
becoming less heterogeneous. In aggregate, both mean that demand is less differentiated,
which impacts aggregate trade in a parallel way.
To estimate (5), we need to specify more fully the model. Firstly, we use the supply
side characteristics of the monopolistic competition model. Firms producing qi in country
i employ li workers in an increasing returns to scale production function li = F + ωqi,
where F is a fixed (labour) costs, and ω the inverse productivity of firms. Profits are
pii = piqi − wi(F + ωqi), with wi the wage rate in country i. Using the pricing equation,
together with the free entry condition, we get the equilibrium output of each representative
firm, qi =
F (σ−1)
ω
. With identical technologies, qi = q, ∀i = 1, . . . , C and noting vi the
value of production for the considered industry in county i, vi = qpini, and we get the first
substitution to be made in equation (5): Ni
Nj
= vi
vj
pj
pi
.
Secondly, a functional form for trade costs (τij) has to be specified in order to get an
estimable equation. Trade costs are a function of distance (dij, which proxies for transport
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costs), “border-related costs”, and uij that represents unobserved determinants. Noting the
ad valorem equivalent of all border-related costs as brcij, we specify (τij as
τij ≡ dδij(1 + brcij)uij.
Border-related costs must be allowed to be quite flexible in our framework. Our primary
goal is to assess a possible North-South divide in market access, we therefore need to allow
for different levels of broadly defined protection in each direction of trade, i.e. North-South
and South-North. An important issue is also the impact of regionalism. We want to control
for the impact of membership of Regional Trading Arrangements (RTAs) in the assessment
of North markets’ access by Southern exporters. Finally, we observe some of the actual tariff
protection taking place between importing and exporting countries. We want in particular
to be able to control for tariffs, in order to assess the share of border effects that can actually
be explained by this simple determinant.
Additional measures of border-related costs are introduced to account for ‘bilateral affini-
ties’ among countries. Such affinities result in general from cultural and historical bilateral
links. They can promote trade either through a positive effect on bilateral preferences or
through more complex channels involving the existence of business networks or similarity
in institutional frameworks that potentially reduce border-related costs. We thus intro-
duce a vector zmij of observable binary arguments, m = 1, . . . ,M , that affect bilateral trade
such as zmij = {contiguityij, common languageij, same countryij, colonial linkij, common
colonizerij}.11
In the most general formulation, we assume the following structure for border-related
costs, which vary across country pair and depend on the direction of the flow for a given
pair:
1 + brcij ≡ (1 + tij)(exp[ηEij + ϕNSij + ψSNij −
M∑
m=1
γmz
m
ij ]).
In this specification, tij denotes the ad valorem bilateral tariff. NSij is a dummy variable set
to one when i( 6= j) belongs to the North and j belongs to the group of Southern countries.
SNij is a dummy variable set to one in the reverse case. Eij is a dummy variable set to one
when both partners belong to the same group of countries (North or South depending on the
model estimated).12 All parameters are expected to be positive, denoting tariff equivalent
of non-tariff barriers. The ranking of ϕ, ψ and η is the primary open question we want to
answer here.
11The “contiguity” variable sets to one if the two countries are contiguous. The “common language”
variable sets to one if a language is spoken by at least 9% of the population in both countries. The “same
country” variable sets to one if the two countries were or are the same state or the same administrative
entity for a long period. The “colonial link” dummy refers to countries that have ever had a colonial link.
The “common colonizer” dummy equals to one if countries have had a common colonizer after 1945.
12When we turn to the impact of regional integration, our specification of border-related costs is different:
1 + brcij ≡ (1 + tij)(exp[ηEij − βRTAij −
∑M
m=1 γmz
m
ij ]), where RTAij is a dummy variable set to 1 when
i( 6= j) and j belongs to a regional integration agreement and Eij is the intercept. We expect β > 0 to be
the lowest of those parameters. This will be true if all national borders impose transaction costs with the
minimum burden of those costs being between RTA members.
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We obtain an estimable equation with home bias. In its more general form, the estimated
equation used in the next sections will be:
ln
(
Xij
Xjj
)
= −θη + ln
(
vi
vj
)
− (1 + θ) ln
(
pi
pj
)
− θ ln(1 + tij)
−θδ ln
(
dij
dii
)
+ θ
M∑
m=1
γmz
m
ij − θ[ϕ− η]NSij − θ[ψ − η]SNij + ij, (6)
with ij = θ(uij − ujj). The constant of this regression (−θη) gives the border effect of
international trade for countries that belong to the same group, the North for instance.
It includes the level of protection of the importing country (η). The coefficient on NSij
indicates the additional difficulty for developing countries in their access to Northern markets.
Symmetrically, SNij indicates the additional difficulty when Northern exporters want to sell
their products on Southern markets.
We will estimate various versions of equation (6), depending on data constraints and on
whether focus is in Northern or/and Southern markets. In particular, we face some data
constraints on tariffs (see below).13 It is clear however from equation (6), that omitting
the ln(1 + tij) term will result in the “missing trade” (caused in reality by tariffs) being
attributed to the impact of crossing national borders (the ones where there are observed
protection implemented).
4 Data requirements
4.1 Production, Trade and Prices
The required data sets involve primarily bilateral trade and production figures in a compat-
ible industry classification for developed and developing countries. Inspired by the Trade,
Production and Protection 1976-2004 database made available by the World Bank (Nicita
and Olarreaga, 2007), we construct an exhaustive trade and production data set covering 26
industrial sectors in the ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification) classification
Revision 2, and 151 exporting and importing countries for the period 1980-2006.14 See the
appendix E for the list of countries, tabulated according to their income level, and industries.
Bilateral trade comes from BACI, the international trade database at the product level
constructed by Gaulier and Zignago (2010). While the Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) trade
data set is based on COMTRADE data, we prefer the use of BACI, to cover more countries,
specially developing ones.15 BACI takes advantage of COMTRADE mirror flows (reports
for both exporting and importing countries) in order to increase the coverage and accuracy
13Not many papers in the literature incorporate the level of bilateral tariffs in border effects’ equations on
a worldwide basis. Fontagne´ and Zignago (2007) is one of those, using a similar sample than the ours but
covering the period 1976-2000.
14We made it available, in a previous version, at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/TradeProd.
htm as the CEPII’s TradeProd database. We updated here the TradeProd online data sets, and extended
the time period by adding information for 2005 and 2006.
15Similarly, Giovannetti and Sanfilippo (2009) use an aggregation of BACI at the ISIC level to analyze
the impact of China in African trade, often missing in other comparable databases.
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of trade data at the most disaggregated international product-level, the Harmonised System
6-digit (HS6) classification.16 At the HS6 level, BACI covers the period 1994-2009. Before
their progressive adoption of the HS classification, countries reported their bilateral trade
in SITC classification since the end of the sixties. Since the industrial production data
starts in 1980 in the ISIC Revision 2 classification, we apply the Gaulier and Zignago (2010)
reconciliation methodology to SITC data.
The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) database is the main
source of manufacturing production data (as well as in Nicita and Olarreaga, 2007). UNIDO
data sets provide worldwide information for the industrial production at the three and four
digits levels. The 4-digit data covers the most recent period 1985-2006, but must be converted
from ISIC Revision 3 into the Revision 2 classification. Additionally, STAN production data
was converted to indexes, and used to fill some missing data. The relative prices are captured
by the price level of GDP expressed relative to the United States. These data come from
the Penn World Tables v.6.3.
4.2 Trade cost
As shown in equation (6), we need measures of bilateral distance between countries (distij)
and within countries (distii). How to define internal distances of countries and how to
make those constructed internal distances consistent with ‘traditional’ international distances
calculations? The second question is crucial for obtaining a correct estimate of the border
effect. Take the example of trade between the United Kingdom and Italy. The GDPs of the
two countries being quite comparable, this will not have a significant impact on the ratio of
domestic to international trade. The first reason why the UK and Italy might trade more
with themselves than with each other is that the average distance (and therefore transport
costs) between a domestic producer and a domestic consumer is much lower than between
a foreign producer and a domestic consumer. Suppose now that for some reason, one mis-
measures the relative distances and thinks distance from Italy to Italy is the same as distance
from UK to Italy. Then the observed surplus of internal trade in Italy with respect to the
UK-Italy flow cannot be explained by differences in distances and has to be captured by the
only remaining impediment to trade in the equation, the border effect. Any overestimate
of the internal / external distance ratio will yield to a mechanic upward bias in the border
effect estimate.
We have developed a new database of internal and external distances, which uses city-
level data in the calculation of the distance matrix to assess the geographic distribution
of population inside each nation. The basic idea, inspired by Head and Mayer (2010),
is to calculate distance between two countries based on bilateral distances between cities
weighted by the share of the city in the overall country’s population. This procedure can be
used in a totally consistent way for both internal and international distances, which solves
the problems highlighted above. We use latitudes, longitudes and populations data of main
agglomerations of all countries available in the world-gazetteer.com web site, which provides
16Gaulier and Zignago (2010) estimate CIF ratios, in order to obtain FOB import values which can be
compared to export FOB values. To average this double information on each flow, authors estimate the
accuracy of each reporter and use it as weights.
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current population figures and geographic coordinates for cities, towns and places of all
countries.
We account also for different levels of ‘bilateral affinity’ and construct various dummy
variables: contiguity, common language, same country, colonial link and common colonizer
links. The first source of the language dummy is the ethnologue.com web site, which allows us
to calculate the share of the population of each country speaking any languages but mainly as
a mother tongue. Hence, to have precise idea about the lingua francas and second languages
spoken in each country, we used two other valuable sources: the CIA world factbook and
Jacques Leclerc web page.17 Sources for colonial variables came from worldstatesmen.org.
See Mayer and Zignago (2011) for a detailed description of the above geography and distances
constructed variables, available online as the GeoDist datasets.18
Bilateral data on trade policy at the industry level come from TRAINS and the CEPII’s
MAcMap database and cover different periods: 1989-2000 and 2001 respectively. The
TRAINS database, from UNCTAD, provides tariffs measured at the bilateral level and for
each product of the HS6 nomenclature from 1989 to 2000.19 We aggregate those tariffs
in order to match our ISIC Revision 2 industry classification using the world imports as
weights for HS6 products. The obtained variable is a rather crude measurement of pro-
tection, when compared for instance with MAcMap datasets made available by Boue¨t et
al. (2008). MAcMap provides a disaggregated, exhaustive and bilateral measurement of
applied tariff duties. It takes into account the complex system of bilateral preferences across
countries in the world. This type of data however lacks a consistent time coverage which
is an important issue here. We thus use MAcMap (aggregated at the relevant ISIC level
as for the TRAINS data) to confirm our results for 2001. These data show that even in
manufactured goods and between industrialized countries, tariffs are not negligible and vary
quite substantially across industries and countries combinations. Tariffs in South-North and
North-South combinations are of course even larger and we are interested in assessing their
impact on trade flows and market access.
5 Market access between Northern and Southern coun-
tries
All regressions from section 5.1 to 5.4 are pooled across the set of industries used, while
subsection 5.5 gives industry-level results. In all regressions, robust standard errors are
clustered by both importer and industry.
5.1 Global results
Table 1 presents results over the entire period of a simple version of equation (6). Column
(1) involves the whole sample of world markets. Columns (2) and (3) give results when the
17www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/index.shtml
18www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
19Precisely, we use the Jon Haveman’s treatment of TRAINS data (UTBC Database, see Haveman, Nair-
Reichert and J. Thursby, 2003).
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sample is restricted to imports of developed (or Northern) countries. Columns (4) and (5)
take the reciprocal case, considering imports by developing (or Southern) countries. Columns
(2) to (5) distinguish between different exporters in terms of market access. Following
the World Bank classification of economies, Northern countries are defined as high-income
countries and the South is defined as the group of countries with a low or medium income.
The list of countries by income category (low, middle and high) is reported in Table 11 (in
appendix E).
The coefficient on relative production is reasonably close to the unitary value predicted
by theory and often found in the gravity equation literature. As expected, the relative prices
are negative and significant in all estimations. The coefficient on distance is in line with the
common findings in the literature (see Disdier and Head, 2008). Coefficients on contiguity
have a higher magnitude than usual, while coefficients on language have the usual sign and
magnitude.
The first row of the first column gives the world average border effect. This estimate
implies that, on average during the period 1980-2006, each country traded around 391 times
more (exp(5.97)) within its national borders than with another country of the world, ceteris
paribus. One of our main objectives is to investigate the market access difficulties faced by
rich and developing exporters. In the Northern markets (column 2), the estimated border
effect falls to 118 (exp(4.77)) when the exporter is in the North but jumps to 503 (exp(6.22))
when the exporter is a developing country.
The tariff equivalent of the difference in market access is quite substantial. The calcula-
tion of tariff equivalent requires an estimate of the elasticity θ. The coefficient on the price
variable is a possible source for this parameter. While negative, the coefficient on the price
term is however disappointing here, with a lot of volatility and very small values. This result
of low price elasticities when using directly proxies for prices is usual in the literature (see
Erkel-Rousse and Mirza, 2002, for instance). The literature provides estimates of the trade
elasticity (interpreted as a demand or a supply side parameter depending on the precise
model). Head and Ries (2001), Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Lai and Trefler (2002), for
instance, suggest that it might be around 8 for developed countries in recent years. Using
this estimate, we find that the tariff equivalent of North-North fragmentation level is then
still exp(4.77/7) − 1 = 98% while the figure is exp(6.22/7) − 1 = 143% for imports coming
from Southern countries. Although North-North trade is far from free, column (2) reveals
that, expressed in tariff equivalent, South-North trade is about 50 percentage points harder.
Column (3) details the revealed additional difficulties of Southern countries in market
access by income level. It appears that the more restricted access in Northern markets is
encountered by lower middle and lower income exporters. The point estimates indicate that
the lower income exporters face a tariff equivalent of the border effect of exp(6.59/7)− 1 =
156%, while the figure for upper middle income exporters is 135%. We find that these tariff
equivalents are statistically different. Note that the “same country” variable and the colonial
links, proxying bilateral North-South affinities, tend to strongly promote access to Northern
markets.
The contrast with the results in Southern markets, shown in columns (4) and (5), is
important. The overall level of openness of those markets is lower than the Northern markets.
However, the border effect is still lower when the exporter originates from a Northern country
(6.08) than from a Southern country (6.55). Southern exporters therefore face a quite similar
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Table 1: North-South Market Access, by Income Levels, 1980-2006
Dependent Variable: Ln Imports Partner/Own
World North imp. North imp. South imp. South imp.
Border -5.97a
(0.02)
Ln Rel. Production 0.73a 0.76a 0.76a 0.73a 0.73a
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln Rel. Prices -0.32a -0.39a -0.52a -0.27a -0.31a
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln Rel. Distance -0.56a -0.53a -0.53a -0.62a -0.63a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Contiguity 1.61a 1.81a 1.81a 1.26a 1.28a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Common Language 0.33a 0.37a 0.37a 0.49a 0.48a
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Same Country 0.58a 1.15a 1.08a 0.97a 0.95a
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Colonial Link 1.02a 0.67a 0.68a 1.04a 1.07a
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Common Colonizer 0.49a 0.76a 0.78a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Northern Exporters -4.77a -4.77a -6.08a -6.02a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Southern Exporters -6.22a -6.55a
(0.03) (0.02)
Upper Middle Inc. Exp. -5.98a -6.32a
(0.03) (0.03)
Lower Middle Inc. Exp. -6.59a -6.71a
(0.03) (0.02)
Low Inc. Exporters -6.49a -6.59a
(0.04) (0.03)
Observations 1818773 811472 811472 1007301 1007301
R2 0.465 0.912 0.913 0.890 0.890
RMSE 2.63 2.57 2.56 2.50 2.50
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by importer-industry, with a denoting
significance at the 1% level.
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high level of access difficulty both on Southern (6.55) and Northern (6.22 in col. 2) markets.
5.2 Evolution
Results in this section detail the evolution of market access over time, starting from 1980
and going to 2006. Specifications are run on individual years. The left panel of Figure (5.2)
depicts the evolution of the world average border effect over time. Based on the specification
of column (1) of Table 1, this figure plots the annual estimates of the Border variable (in
absolute value) and the clustered 95% confidence interval around the point estimate. The
high revealed restrictions in market access at the beginning of the eighties tend clearly to
decrease over time. The estimated border effect has decreased from 764 (exp(6.64)) in 1980
to 131 (exp(4.88)) in 2006.
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Figure 1: World (left), North and South (right) border effects 1980-2006
The right panel of Figure (5.2) depicts the evolution of the Northern and Southern
border effects over time in world trade. Based on the specification of columns (2) and (4)
of Table 1 (but without restricting the sample to one direction of trade), this figure plots
the annual estimates of the Northern and Southern exporters variables (in absolute value)
and the clustered 95% confidence interval around the point estimates. The figure shows
that the Southern border effect is much larger in magnitude than the Northern the border
effect. However, both border effects have strongly decreased from 1980 to 2006, mirroring
the evolution of the average world border effect.
We now focus on the evolution of access to Northern markets. We investigate whether
the current high level of revealed restrictions in market access is a persistent phenomenon,
and whether there has been some progress recently on this front. Table 2 gives overall results
for the access to the Northern countries markets over time.20 The first three columns provide
an overview of how coefficients evolve over three successive periods of time (1980-1988, 1989-
1997 and 1998-2006). The last four columns give results with additional controls included,
20In this table, we drop imports of Hong-Kong and Singapore. Those two countries are characterized by
very large openness to developing countries’ exports, together with extremely small internal distance. Those
two phenomena tend to bias upwards the estimate on bilateral distance and therefore also the one on borders.
The trend of the border effects over time is however unchanged when including those two countries.
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i.e., tariffs and NAFTA membership. The fifth column (1989-1997) restricts the sample to
those observations for which tariffs are available.21 The sixth column gives results for the
same period with tariffs included.
Table 2: Difficulties for Developing Countries in Rich Countries’ Market Access over Time
Dependent Variable: Ln Imports Partner/Own
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
80-88 89-97 98-06 89-97 89-97 89-97 98-06
Border -8.23a -6.36a -5.11a -6.38a -5.98a -5.90a -5.14a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06)
Ln Rel. Production 0.64a 0.73a 0.79a 0.73a 0.72a 0.72a 0.79a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln Rel. Prices -0.58a -0.32a -0.35a -0.32a -0.23a -0.24a -0.35a
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Ln Rel. Distance -0.17a -0.51a -0.78a -0.51a -0.60a -0.60a -0.77a
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Contiguity 1.76a 1.88a 1.62a 1.78a 1.63a 1.62a 1.45a
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07)
Common Language 0.39a 0.09b 0.22a 0.08b -0.05 -0.04 0.19a
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
Colonial Link 0.54a 0.89a 1.09a 0.91a 0.98a 0.97a 1.13a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06)
NAFTA 2.28a 2.07a 2.03a 1.82a
(0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.10)
Ln (1+Tariff) -2.22a
(0.55)
Observations 102297 161866 156796 161866 53743 53743 156796
R2 0.323 0.404 0.434 0.405 0.381 0.382 0.434
RMSE 2.70 2.63 2.79 2.63 2.66 2.66 2.79
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by importer-industry, with a and b denoting
significance at the 1% and 5% levels.
Noteworthy is first the substantial improvement of the fit of the regression over time. Our
empirical specification of trade patterns is an increasingly good description of reality for the
South→ North trade, which is not the case in general when this type of regression is applied
to North-North trade flows. A possible interpretation is that the underlying theoretical moti-
vations of the regressions are increasingly relevant over time for the South-North trade flows.
The first row of Table 2 reveals that, even if the current level of access to Northern markets is
very restricted, it is twenty three times easier to enter those markets for a Southern country
exporter now than what it used to be at the end of the seventies (exp(8.23)/ exp(5.11)).
21Bilateral tariffs are only available for the period 1989-2001, with two different sources, and thus are not
introduced in the first (1980-1988) and last (1998-2006) periods. See section 5.3 for regressions including
tariffs.
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While room for improvement is clearly large, there has been considerable increase in the
access of developing countries’ products on developed countries’ markets.
Whether the remaining level of difficulty in market access is due to residual protection
or other factors such as preferences for Northern products or different qualities of goods is
hard to identify. One thing that appears clearly by comparing columns (5) and (6) is that
tariffs are not the dominant explanation of market access restrictions in this type of South-
North trade flows: The border effect falls by less than 8% when tariffs are taken into account
((exp(5.98 − 5.90) − 1). One dimension of the data we can use to shed more light on this
issue is the different importing countries in the Northern sample. If Southern exporters face
highly restricted market access because their export varieties match homogeneously badly
with Northern preferences, then the estimated border effects should be broadly similar across
importing Northern countries. As Tables 5, 6 and 7 in Appendix B reveal, there is on the
contrary wide variance in those South-North border effects. During the 1998-2006 period,
EU15 countries trade on average exp(4.78) = 119 times more with themselves than with a
developing country of similar size and other characteristics. This figure was exp(5.13) = 169
for the USA and Canada and only exp(2.32) = 10 for the Japanese market. The figure for the
EU hides wide disparities among European countries, with some EU countries being much
more closed than others to imports from the South. Note lastly that coefficients on distance
are widely different, Japan, the USA and Canada being far more sensitive to distance than
EU countries in their trade patterns with the developing world.
Table 3 shows the changes in the estimated border effects between each period for each
developing country of the sample. Unsurprisingly, East Asian exporters, from China in
particular, are among those for which changes in access to Northern markets are more favor-
able. EU neighbors, such as Bulgaria and Romania, also improve largely their access to rich
countries between the periods 1989-1997 and 1998-2006. Latin American largest economies
are facing also less difficulties than before in reaching Northern industrial markets. On the
contrary, African countries are in general under the median levels except for Nigeria which
has substantially reduced its border effect.
5.3 Tariff Measures
We benefit here from the TRAINS and MAcMap data sets providing a disaggregated, ex-
haustive and bilateral measurement of applied tariff duties. The introduction of bilateral
tariffs (ln(1+tariff)) in the estimated equation restricts however the sample to the years
1989-2001. The results are reported in Table 4, with different tariff measures. Columns (1),
(3) and (5) use TRAINS-based tariffs and cover the period 1989-2000. MAcMap tariffs are
used in columns (2), (4) and (6), which only cover the year 2001. The MAcMap measure,
which improves notably the way preferential trade agreements and other exceptions to the
usual WTO rules are taken into account, allows us to check the robustness of the results
obtained with TRAINS information.
As expected the tariff elasticity is negative in all regressions, irrespective of the tariff
measures. Moreover, comparing columns (1) and (2), the difference in magnitude between
the TRAINS and the MAcMap tariffs is marginal. The difference is however larger when
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Table 3: Changes in Access to Northern Markets
Border effect coefficient Percent change between periods
Country 1980-1988 1988-1997 1998-2006 second/first third/second
Nigeria 12.2 12.9 6.4 5.7 -50.4
Fiji 6.6 7.5 3.8 13.6 -49.3
Bulgaria 8.4 7.2 3.8 -14.3 -47.2
Tajikistan 7.2 4 -44.4
Romania 6.3 5.8 3.5 -7.9 -39.7
Egypt 9.1 7.4 4.8 -18.7 -35.1
Turkey 8.5 6.2 4.1 -27.1 -33.9
China 8.9 6.7 4.7 -24.7 -29.9
India 10.8 8.7 6.1 -19.4 -29.9
Malaysia 7.8 6 4.3 -23.1 -28.3
Thailand 10.4 6.1 4.6 -41.3 -24.6
Tunisia 7.4 6.5 4.9 -12.2 -24.6
Hungary 7.1 5.9 4.5 -16.9 -23.7
Slovakia 4.7 3.6 -23.4
El Salvador 9.5 9.7 7.5 2.1 -22.7
Poland 7.5 5.5 4.3 -26.7 -21.8
Czech Rep. 5.3 4.2 -20.8
Morocco 7.7 5.5 4.4 -28.6 -20
South Africa 9.2 8.2 6.7 -10.9 -18.3
Venezuela 9.3 8.2 6.8 -11.8 -17.1
Saudi Arabia 8.8 7.3 -17
Korea 8.2 6.5 5.4 -20.7 -16.9
Armenia 11.8 10 -15.3
Brazil 6.3 5.5 -12.7
Guatemala 9.7 8.7 7.6 -10.3 -12.6
Mexico 9.6 6.7 6.2 -30.2 -7.5
Iran 10 9.8 9.3 -2 -5.1
Chile 8.3 8.3 7.9 0 -4.8
Latvia 6.6 6.3 -4.5
Mauritius 8.5 8.8 8.4 3.5 -4.5
Kyrgyzstan 10.3 9.9 -3.9
Ethiopia 8.5 8.2 -3.5
Argentina 8.6 9.1 8.8 5.8 -3.3
Cameroon 7.8 6.8 6.6 -12.8 -2.9
MEDIAN 8.85 7.4 7.3 -12.5 -2.9
Senegal 8.3 10.5 10.2 26.5 -2.9
Indonesia 9.2 4.1 4 -55.4 -2.4
Colombia 9.1 8.9 8.7 -2.2 -2.2
Tanzania 9.4 12.2 12 29.8 -1.6
Ukraine 6.3 6.2 -1.6
Jordan 10.8 9.2 9.1 -14.8 -1.1
Peru 8.8 9.1 9.1 3.4 0
Estonia 5.3 5.4 1.9
Kenya 10 10.8 11.1 8 2.8
Syrian Arab Rep. 12.2 10 10.3 -18 3
Oman 11.9 12.3 3.4
Mongolia 11.7 12.1 3.4
Sri Lanka 9.5 8.5 8.8 -10.5 3.5
Uruguay 7.9 6.8 7.1 -13.9 4.4
Malta 6.1 6.8 7.1 11.5 4.4
Yemen 14.3 15 4.9
Ecuador 10.9 9.4 10 -13.8 6.4
Macedonia 6.1 6.6 8.2
Philippines 8.9 7.3 7.9 -18 8.2
Russia 6 6.5 8.3
Lithuania 5.8 6.3 8.6
Bolivia 7.4 7.8 8.6 5.4 10.3
Bangladesh 7.6 7.4 8.8 -2.6 18.9
Albania 5.1 6.2 21.6
Panama 11.1 9.2 11.2 -17.1 21.7
Azerbaijan 10.5 13.2 25.7
Nepal 5 8.3 10.5 66 26.5
Eritrea 8.4 10.9 29.8
Trinidad and Tobago 9.4 6 7.8 -36.2 30
Moldova 7.3 9.6 31.5
Costa Rica 9.3 6.9 9.1 -25.8 31.9
Malawi 4.3 8.3 11 93 32.5
Niger 7.8 10.8 38.5
Ghana 8.5 5 7.1 -41.2 42
Kazakhstan 4.7 10 112.8
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Table 4: Global Market Access: Different Tariff Measures
Dependent Variable: Ln Imports Partner/Own
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Markets: World World North North South South
Time period: 1989-2000 2001 1989-2000 2001 1989-2000 2001
Border -5.03a -5.48a
(0.06) (0.11)
Ln Rel. Production 0.77a 0.74a 0.78a 0.78a 0.77a 0.73a
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln Rel. Prices -0.05b -0.25a -0.33a -0.64a -0.30a -0.43a
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06)
Ln Rel. Distance -0.64a -0.59a -0.56a -0.54a -0.65a -0.72a
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
Contiguity 1.54a 1.36a 1.65a 1.79a 1.27a 1.40a
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.14) (0.04) (0.07)
Common Language 0.41a 0.65a 0.29a 0.59a 0.74a 0.70a
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (0.03) (0.06)
Same Country 0.53a 0.96a 0.79a 0.83a 1.03a 0.95a
(0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.21) (0.06) (0.10)
Colonial Link 0.90a 1.00a 0.73a 0.76a 0.86a 0.93a
(0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.13) (0.05) (0.08)
Common Colonizer 0.86a 0.79a 0.84a 0.95a
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
TRAINS Tariffs -5.18a -4.65a -2.59a
(0.41) (0.41) (0.29)
MAcMaps Tariffs -4.97a -3.05a -4.38a
(0.34) (0.48) (0.38)
Northern Exporters -4.32a -4.79a -5.35a -4.85a
(0.06) (0.16) (0.09) (0.15)
Southern Exporters -5.70a -5.99a -6.05a -5.66a
(0.07) (0.18) (0.08) (0.13)
Observations 310713 76379 177271 29629 133442 46750
R2 0.502 0.488 0.920 0.911 0.909 0.893
RMSE 2.54 2.62 2.53 2.68 2.39 2.51
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by importer-industry, with a and b denoting
significance at the 1% and 5% levels. Tariff are inserted in the specification as: ln (1+tariff).
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restricting the sample to Northern or Southern importers. Table 8 in appendix C reports
the regressions of Table 4 on the exact same sample but without the tariff variables. The
comparison of both tables confirms that tariffs are not the dominant explanation of barriers
faced by developing exporters when trying to enter advanced markets.
Using our estimated world trade elasticity (5.18), the tariff equivalent of the world frag-
mentation level is about 233% (= exp(5.03/(4.18) − 1)) in the first column. Note that this
is the tariff equivalent of preferences and trade restrictions, after having controlled for tar-
iffs, that exert a negative impact on trade on their own. The last row of columns (3) to
(6) confirms that Southern exporters face larger difficulties in both Northern and Southern
markets.
5.4 The impact of regional trade agreements
Our objective in this section is to gauge the impact of regional trade agreements (RTAs).
To investigate this issue, we incorporate dummy variables capturing the lower (or higher)
impact of borders on trade inside each RTA, and thus characterizing the extent of integration
of the zone, compared to trade taking place in the rest of the sample. We identify four main
actual RTAs: EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN. Some of those RTAs include only
Northern countries (the EU), some only Southern ones (MERCOSUR and ASEAN), and
NAFTA includes two developed countries and a developing country. The impact of those
agreements is interesting for our matter in the perspective of several trading arrangements
that might take place in the near future, notably between Northern and Southern countries.
The potential arrangement between the EU and MERCOSUR is a prominent example on
which the impact of the existing set of RTAs can shed light.
The impact of each RTA is expected to be quite different. The European Union is
undoubtedly the largest experiment of regional integration in the recent period, character-
ized by a long term commitment of member countries to achieve wide-range integration.
MERCOSUR is a customs union signed in 1991 between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay but implemented in 1995, with member countries substantially liberalizing their in-
ternal trade during the transition period. The common external tariff covered 85% of tariff
lines in 1995 and a schedule for convergence towards a complete common external tariff and
free trade was then agreed upon but significantly disturbed by the macroeconomic problems
in Brazil and Argentina at the end of the nineties. NAFTA is a free trade agreement that
entered into force between the USA, Canada and Mexico in January 1994. Tariff reductions
among member countries were scheduled on a 10/15 years agenda. An interesting aspect
is its North-South nature. ASEAN is officially a free trade agreement between Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines since 1977, but intra bloc trade liberaliza-
tion was really implemented on a large scale starting with the ASEAN free trade agreement
in 1992 (Soloaga and Winters, 2001).
Figure 2 graphs the evolution of border effects coefficients for the world and inside each
of the considered RTA. Those estimates are based on regressions where, for each year, the
relative trade flow is regressed on the explanatory variables of the first column of Table 1
and a dummy variable for each RTA.
This representation offers a richer picture of how market fragmentation is receding in each
of the considered regional arrangements. A striking characteristic is the apparent convergence
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Figure 2: Evolution of the impact of regional agreements
in the absolute level of integration of the EU15, NAFTA and ASEAN until the end of the
90’s. The EU starts far more integrated (exp(3.96) in 1980) than the other two zones (exp(6)
in 1980 for ASEAN), but those gradually catch up and end up very close to the level of EU
integration at the end of the 90’s (exp(3.64), exp(4.13) and exp(3.75) for the EU, NAFTA
and ASEAN in 1999 respectively). Since then, the EU has further pursued its process of
integration. Note that the increase in estimated EU15 fragmentation in 1986 comes from
the membership of two relatively closed economies at the time, Spain and specially Portugal.
Less pronounced, the increase in 1995 is due to the entry of Austria, Finland and Sweden.
For the most recent period, after 1999, there seems to be a clear ranking of integration
with EU countries being the most integrated zone followed by NAFTA, ASEAN and then
MERCOSUR, for which border effect coefficients fall markedly since the period 1993-1995
(which is interesting as 1995 is the date where most internal trade liberalization should have
been completed).
Those results point to expected and reasonable estimates of the effect of trading arrange-
ments, as in Baier in Bergstrand (2007). A higher effect of the RTA on trade translates into
lower border effects. Previous literature produced contrasted of the effect of RTA on trade.
Frankel (1997, Table 4.2) for instance, finds mostly insignificant effects of EU membership,
once common language and overall openness are taken into account. Soloaga and Winters
(2001) find an overall negative and significant impact of EU membership, no significant im-
pact for NAFTA or ASEAN and an extremely important positive impact of MERCOSUR,
roughly constant since 1980. ASEAN is found here to have a sizable impact on trade vol-
umes, that is growing over time, the order of magnitude of the effect is comparable to what
is found in Frankel (1997) and points to the dynamism of international trade in the region.
Here, as stated in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004) and Carre`re (2006), the rigorous
link of the empirical specification with theory proves crucial for a correct assessment of the
impact of both national borders and regional integration. The puzzling results in the pre-
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vious literature where the deepest integration experiences did not seem to yield consistent
important surpluses of trade are here qualified. The border effect methodology gives us a
picture which seems to confirm the conventional view that EU and NAFTA have a large
impact on trade flows (although it should again be noted that those areas are still far from
perfectly integrated even in recent years).
Table 9 in the appendix returns to the reciprocity issue in North-South market access by
taking into account the above RTAs and the whole time period. The Andean Community,
a rather old regional trade agreement, usually seen as having been less effective in true
reductions of the level of protection in those countries, is also introduced. Column (1) starts
with an overall estimate of the impact of regional agreements in the complete world sample.
The estimates reveal that the average country in a regional agreement trades exp(6.31 −
2.28) ' 56 times more with itself than with another country of the same RTA, while this
ratio is 10 times higher when no RTA covers the bilateral trade flow (exp(6.31)). The
estimates of the border effects of the EU countries in the North-North sample in column (2)
is exp(5.17−1.40) ' 43. The estimate of the EU border effect is higher than the most recent
ones in the literature. Taking representative coefficients mostly based on EU12 or even EU9
countries, Nitsch (2000) finds a border effect around 10 in 1990, Head and Mayer (2000) find
13 for the 1993-1995 period and Chen (2004) finds a multiplicative factor of 6 for internal
trade flows in 1996. One possible reason is due to the fact that our sample includes all 15 EU
countries and that trade data for Belgium – a very open country – is mostly missing at the
disaggregated 3 digit level. More generally, as stated above, the absolute level of estimated
border effects is crucially dependent on the way international and internal distances are
measured. Studies differ a lot on this aspect, which makes it very hard to compare levels
across studies.
The free trade agreement between the United States and Canada also has a positive
and significant impact on bilateral trade, although lower than the European Union. An
interesting result on NAFTA is obtained from comparing columns (4) and (5). Mexico faces
a level of fragmentation around 82 (exp(6.71 − 2.30)) on the Northern American markets,
while US and Canadian exporters’ corresponding access is only slightly less difficult, with a
level around 78 (exp(5.97− 1.61)). The estimated level of market access in the South-South
combinations is extremely low (an estimated border effect of exp(6.60) on average), but it
is interesting to note that, contrary to the Andean Community, MERCOSUR and ASEAN
had a very sizable impact on market access inside those agreements. Sharing a common
colonizer also has a very substantial impact on reciprocal market access, confirming in a
different setting the finding of Rose (2000).
5.5 Sectoral results
In the previous subsections we have pooled the data across the set of industries used. In
this subsection, we provide industry-level results (see appendix for the list of industries E).
Figure 3 reports border effects coefficients in industry by industry regressions.22 We obtain
those coefficients for the three different sub-periods, which enables comparisons over time.
22As in the previous section, the explanatory variables are those of the first column of Table 1.
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2 4 6 8 10
Tobacco
Petroleum refineries
Beverages
Printing and publishing
Food products
Other non−metal min. prod.
Other chemicals
Furniture except metal
Plastic products
Fabricated metal products
Wood products except furniture
Paper and products
Pottery china earthenware
Prof. and sci. equipment
Glass and products
Footwear
Non−ferrous metals
Machinery except electrical
Transport equipment
Leather products
Machinery electric
Iron and steel
Industrial chemicals
Textiles
Wearing apparel
Rubber products
Period 1980−1988 Period 1989−1997
Period 1998−2006
Figure 3: Evolution of market access South → North, by sector
The developed markets that are the most difficult to enter in the last period are Tobacco,
Petroleum refineries, Beverages industries and Printing and publishing notably. On the
opposite extreme, different types of machinery, wearing apparel, textiles and chemicals are
the relatively easiest markets to export to. All those industries have been characterized by
considerable improvement in market access, with Transport equipment, Rubber products
and Electric machinery being among the leading examples of products which switched from
one of the most difficult to export to the North, to one of the easiest in twenty years.
6 Conclusion
This paper measures difficulties in market access over a wide sample of countries (both
developing and developed), industries and years. It therefore tries to put precise numbers on
the extent of market fragmentation, which is one of the key parameters in spatial economics.
We use a gravity-type model of trade patterns structurally grounded in theory to estimate
global and regional border effects. In particular, we analyze the impact of national borders
on revealed access to Northern markets by Southern producers, which repeatedly claim the
difficulties faced by their exporters in acceding rich markets.
Results show that difficulties faced by developing countries’ exporters in accessing devel-
oped countries consumers are higher than difficulties faced by Northern exporters. Currently,
expressed in tariff equivalent, South-North trade is about 50% harder than North-North
trade, with LDC’s facing the highest barriers. These international fragmentation have how-
ever experienced a noticeable fall since 1980 in both Southern and Northern markets, and in
all industries. While the current level of access to Northern markets is very restricted, it is
twenty three times easier to enter those markets for a Southern country exporter now than
what it used to be in the end of the seventies. Japanese market appears as largely more
open to developing exporters than the North-American and European ones.
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Another of our results concerns the impact of tariffs on market access. While tariffs still
have in general an influence on trade patterns, they do not seem to be an important part of
the border effect faced by Southern exporters on Northern markets. After having controlled
for tariffs, the tariff equivalent of preferences and trade restrictions is still 233% during the
period 1980-2006, with Southern exporters facing larger difficulties.
We also show that the proximity of the empirical specification with theory changes the
estimates related to the impact of regional agreements and put them more in line with our
expectations than some results in the literature. The EU, CUSA/NAFTA, ASEAN/AFTA
and MERCOSUR agreements all tend to reduce the estimated degree of market fragmenta-
tion within those zones, with an expected ranking between the respective impact of those
agreements.
7 References
Aitken, N. (1973), “The Effect of the EEC and EFTA on European Trade: A Temporal
Cross-Section Analysis”, American Economic Review 63(5): 881-892.
Anderson, J. (1979), “A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Equation”, American
Economic Review 69(1): 106-116.
Anderson, J. (2011), “The Gravity Model”, Annuals Review of Economics 3: 133160.
Anderson, J. and E. van Wincoop (2003), “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the
Border Puzzle”, American Economic Review 93(1): 170-192.
Anderson, J. and E. van Wincoop (2004), “Trade Costs”, Journal of Economic Lit-
erature 42(3): 691-751.
Anderson, S., A. de Palma and J.-F. Thisse (1992), Discrete Choice. Theory of
Product Differentiation, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Baier, S. and J. Bergstrand (2007), “Do Free Trade Agreements Actually Increase
Members’ International Trade?”, Journal of International Economics 71: 7295.
Boue¨t, A., Y. Decreux, L. Fontagne´, S. Jean, and D. Laborde (2008), “Assessing
Applied Protection across the World”, Review of International Economics 16(5): 850-
863.
Carre`re, C. (2006), “ Revisiting the Effects of Regional Trade Agreements on Trade
Flows with Proper Specification of the Gravity Model”, European Economic Review
50(2): 223-247.
Chaney, T. (2008), “ Distorted Gravity: Heterogeneous Firms, Market Structure and the
Geography of International trade”, American Economic Review 98(4): 1707-1721.
Chen, N. (2004), “Intra-national versus International Trade in the European Union: why
Do National Borders Matter?”, Journal of International Economics 63(1): 93118.
De Sousa, J. and J. Lochard (2011), “Does the Single Currency Affect Foreign Direct
Investment?”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 113(3): 553-578.
23
Disdier, A-C. and K. Head (2008), “The Puzzling Persistence of the Distance Effect
on Bilateral Trade”, Review of Economics and Statistics 90(1): 37-48.
Eaton, J. and S. Kortum (2002), “Technology, Geography and Trade”, Econometrica
70(5): 1741-1780.
Erkel-Rousse, H. and D. Mirza (2002), “Import Price-elasticities: Reconsidering the
Evidence”, Canadian Journal of Economics 35(2): 282-306.
Evenett, S. and W. Keller (2003), “On Theories Explaining the Success of the Gravity
Equation”, Journal of Political Economy 110(2): 281-316.
Feenstra, R. (2004), Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence, Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Fontagne´, L. and S. Zignago (2007), “A Re-evaluation of the Impact of Regional Trade
Agreements”, International Economics 109(1): 31-51.
Frankel, J.A., 1997, Regional Trading Blocs, Washington: Institute for International
Economics.
Frankel, J., E. Stein and S-J. Wei, 1995, “Trading Blocs and the Americas: The
Natural, the Unnatural, and the Supernatural”, Journal of Development Economics
47(1):61-95.
Frazer, G. and J. Van Biesebroeck (2010), “Trade Growth under the African Growth
and Opportunity Act,” Review of Economics and Statistics 92(1): 128-144.
Fukao, K., T. Okubo and R. Stern (2001), “An Econometric Analysis of Trade
Diversion Under NAFTA”, North American Journal of Economics and Finance 14:3-
24.
Gaulier, G. and S. Zignago (2010), “BACI: International Trade Database at the
Product-level. The 1994-2007 Version,” CEPII Working Paper 23.
Giovannetti, G. and M. Sanfilippo (2009), “Do Chinese Exports Crowd-out African
Goods? An econometric Analysis by country and sector,” European Journal of Devel-
opment Research 21: 506-530.
Haveman, J., U. Nair-Reichert and J. Thursby (2003), “How Effective are Trade
Barriers? An Empirical Analysis of Trade Reduction, Diversion and Compression”,
Review of Economics and Statistics 85(2): 480-485.
Head, K. and T. Mayer (2000), “Non-Europe : The Magnitude and Causes of Market
Fragmentation in Europe”, Weltwirschaftliches Archiv 136(2):285-314.
Head, K. and T. Mayer (2010), “Illusory Border Effects: Distance Mismeasurement
Inflates Estimates of Home Bias in Trade”, in Brakman, S. and P. van Bergeijk (eds.),
The Gravity Model in International Trade: Advances and Applications, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Head, K. and T. Mayer (2011), “Gravity, Market Potential and Economic Develop-
ment”, Journal of Economic Geography 1(2): 281-294.
Head, K., T. Mayer, and J. Ries (2010), “The Erosion of Colonial Trade Linkages
after Independence”, Journal of International Economics 81: 1-14.
24
Head, K. and J. Ries (2001), “Increasing Returns Versus National Product Differenti-
ation as an Explanation for the Pattern of US-Canada Trade”, American Economic
Review 91(4): 858-876.
Head, K. and J. Ries (2008), “ FDI as an Outcome of the Market for Corporate Control:
Theory and Evidence”, Journal of International Economics 74(1): 2-20.
Krugman, P.R. (1980), “Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of
Trade”, American Economic Review 70:950-959.
Lai, N. and D. Trefler (2002), “The Gains from Trade with Monopolistic Competition:
Specification, Estimation, and Mis-Specification”, NBER Working Paper 9169.
Krugman, P. and A. Venables (1995), “Globalization and the Inequality of Nations”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(4): 857-80.
Mayer, T. and S. Zignago (2011), “Notes on CEPII’s distances measures: The GeoDist
Database”, CEPII Working Paper 25.
McCallum, J. (1995), “ National Borders Matter: Canada-US Regional Trade Patterns”,
American Economic Review 85:615-623.
Nicita, A. and V. Olarreaga (2007), “Trade, production and protection, 1976-2004”,
World Bank Economic Review 21(1): 165-171.
Nitsch, V. (2000), “National Borders and International Trade: Evidence from the Euro-
pean Union”, Canadian Journal of Economics 33(4): 1091-1105.
Soloaga I. and A. Winters (2001), “Regionalism in the Nineties: What Effect on
Trade?”, North American Journal of Economics and Finance 12: 1-29.
Romalis, J. (2007), “NAFTA’s and CUSFTA’s Impact on North American Trade”, Review
of Economics and Statistics 89(3): 416-435.
Rose, A. (2000), “One Money, One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common Currencies
on Trade”, Economic Policy 30:9-45.
Thisse, J. (2012) “Economic Geography”, in Faccarello, G. and H. Kurz (eds), Handbook
of the History of Economic Analysis, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Wei, S-J. (1996), “Intra-National Versus International Trade: How Stubborn Are Nations
in Global Integration?”, NBER Working Paper 5531.
25
A Evolution of the import shares of Least Developed
Countries on main rich markets (1989-2006)
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Figure 4: Share of LDCs in total (left) and manufacturing (right) imports of European
Union (15)
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Figure 5: Share of LDCs in total (left) and manufacturing (right) imports of Japan
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Figure 6: Share of LDCs in total (left) and manufacturing (right) imports of the USA
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B Difficulties for developing countries in the Quad coun-
tries’ market access over time
Table 5: Difficulties for Developing Countries in Japanese Market Access over Time
Dependent Variable: Ln Imports Partner/Own
1980-1988 1989-1997 1998-2006
Border -4.10a -2.02a -2.32a
(0.22) (0.21) (0.19)
Ln Rel. Production 0.72a 0.85a 0.87a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln Rel. Prices -0.66a -0.25a -0.53a
(0.15) (0.08) (0.08)
Ln Rel. Distance -1.61a -1.86a -1.79a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 5470 7879 7421
R2 0.394 0.511 0.532
RMSE 2.72 2.52 2.62
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by importer-industry, with a denoting significance
at the 1% level.
Table 6: Difficulties for Developing Countries in European Market Access over time
Dependent Variable: Ln Imports Partner/Own
1980-1988 1989-1997 1998-2006
Border -8.09a -6.24a -4.78a
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Ln Rel. Production 0.60a 0.71a 0.78a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln Rel. Prices -0.72a -0.47a -0.35a
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Ln Rel. Distance -0.21a -0.54a -0.79a
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Contiguity 1.27a 1.81a 1.75a
(0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Common Language 0.51a 0.18a 0.31a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Colonial Link 0.06 0.45a 0.64a
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Observations 68531 99317 92725
R2 0.256 0.345 0.391
RMSE 2.69 2.64 2.84
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by importer-industry, with a denoting significance
at the 1% level.
27
Table 7: Difficulties for Developing Countries in the USA and Canadian Market Access over
Time
Dependent Variable: Ln Imports Partner/Own
1980-1988 1989-1997 1998-2006
Border -8.24a -6.24a -5.13a
(0.12) (0.12) (0.16)
Ln Rel. Production 0.70a 0.76a 0.83a
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Ln Rel. Prices -1.19a -0.31a -0.50a
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Ln Rel. Distance -0.55a -0.80a -1.02a
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
Contiguity 2.71a 3.03a 1.32a
(0.13) (0.12) (0.18)
Common Language 0.66a 0.42a 0.53a
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Colonial Link 1.71a 2.58a 2.25a
(0.14) (0.15) (0.21)
NAFTA 1.56a 1.84a
(0.15) (0.18)
Observations 11648 17156 15944
R2 0.317 0.394 0.482
RMSE 2.77 2.67 2.67
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by importer-industry, with a denoting
significance at the 1% level.
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C Tariff measures: robustness check
Table 8: Robustness: Results of Table 4 without Tariff Measures
Dependent Variable: Ln Imports Partner/Own
World World North imp. North imp. South imp. South imp.
Border -5.44a -5.91a
(0.06) (0.11)
Ln Rel. Production 0.76a 0.73a 0.77a 0.77a 0.78a 0.75a
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln Rel. Prices -0.29a -0.42a -0.32a -0.63a -0.40a -0.56a
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06)
Ln Rel. Distance -0.65a -0.59a -0.57a -0.54a -0.64a -0.73a
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
Contiguity 1.67a 1.43a 1.75a 1.85a 1.35a 1.54a
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.14) (0.04) (0.07)
Common Language 0.36a 0.64a 0.27a 0.59a 0.72a 0.66a
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (0.03) (0.06)
Same Country 0.46a 1.00a 0.72a 0.70a 1.12a 1.06a
(0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.21) (0.06) (0.10)
Colonial Link 0.96a 1.08a 0.70a 0.78a 0.84a 0.95a
(0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.13) (0.05) (0.08)
Common Colonizer 0.51a 0.66a 0.71a 0.90a
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09)
Northern Exporters -4.43a -4.91a -5.66a -5.22a
(0.06) (0.17) (0.08) (0.14)
Southern Exporters -5.80a -6.10a -6.44a -6.14a
(0.07) (0.18) (0.07) (0.12)
Observations 310713 76379 177271 29629 133442 46750
R2 0.482 0.470 0.919 0.910 0.907 0.889
RMSE 2.59 2.67 2.54 2.69 2.41 2.56
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by importer-industry, with a denoting
significance at the 1% level.
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D Reciprocity in North-South Market Access, with
Regional Trade Agreements
Table 9: North-South Market Access, with Regional Trade Agreements
Dependent Variable: Ln Imports Partner/Own
World N ⇒ N S ⇒ S N ⇒ S S ⇒ N
Border -6.31a -5.17a -6.60a -5.97a -6.71a
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Ln Rel. Production 0.72a 0.77a 0.75a 0.72a 0.73a
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln Rel. Prices -0.30a -0.26a -0.26a -0.28a -0.45a
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Ln Rel. Distance -0.49a -0.49a -0.60a -0.63a -0.42a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Contiguity 1.16a 1.34a 1.42a 1.60a 2.26a
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Common Language 0.32a 0.51a 0.50a 0.67a 0.41a
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Colonial Link 1.16a 0.87a 0.85a 0.63a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
Common Colonizer 0.57a 0.71a
(0.02) (0.02)
Same Country 0.64a 0.36a 0.84a
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
RTAs 2.28a
(0.02)
EU 1.40a
(0.02)
CUSA 0.43a
(0.05)
MERCOSUR 1.17a
(0.06)
ASEAN 1.03a
(0.05)
Andean Community -0.53a
(0.04)
NAFTA 1.61a 2.30a
(0.13) (0.08)
Observations 1818773 378260 437623 569678 433212
R2 0.482 0.521 0.437 0.420 0.391
RMSE 2.58 2.26 2.64 2.39 2.76
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by importer-industry, with a denoting
significance at the 1% level.
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E List of industries and countries
Table 10: List of the 26 ISIC 3-digit industries included in the sample
Code ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification) Rev. 2 3-digit
31 Food, Beverages and Tobacco
311-312 Food
313 Beverage
314 Tobacco
32 Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries
321 Textiles
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear
323 Leather and products of leather, leather substitutes and fur
324 Footwear, except vulcanized or moulded rubber or plastic footwear
33 Wood and Wood Products, Including Furniture
331 Wood and cork products, except furniture
332 Furniture and fixtures, except primarily of metal
34 Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing
341 Paper and paper products
342 Printing, publishing and allied industries
35 Chemicals and Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic Products
351 Industrial chemicals
352 Other chemical products
353 Petroleum refineries
355 Rubber products
356 Plastic products not elsewhere classified
36 Non-Metallic Mineral Products, except Products of Petroleum and Coal
361 Pottery, china and earthenware
362 Glass and glass products
369 Other non-metallic mineral products
37 Basic Metal Industries
371 Iron and steel basic industries
372 Non-ferrous metal basic industries
38 Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment
381 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
382 Machinery except electrical
383 Electrical machinery apparatus, appliances and supplies
384 Transport equipment
385 Professional and scientific, and measuring and controlling equipment
not elsewhere classified, and of photographic and optical goods
31
Table 11: List of countries included in the sample
High income Upper-middle income Lower-middle income Low income
High income Middle-high income Middle-low income Low income
Australia Argentina Albania Afghanistan
Austria Bahrain Algeria Armenia
Bahamas Barbados Belize Azerbaijan
Belgium-Lux. Brazil Bolivia Bangladesh
Bermuda Chile Bulgaria Benin
Canada Croatia Cape verde Bhutan
Cyprus Czech Rep. China Burkina faso
Denmark Estonia Colombia Burundi
Finland Gabon Costa rica Cambodia
France Hungary Cuba Cameroon
Germany Korea Dominican Rep. Central African Rep.
Greece Lebanon Ecuador Congo
Hong kong Libya Egypt Cote d’ivoire
Iceland Malaysia El salvador Eritrea
Ireland Malta Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia
Israel Mauritius Fiji Gambia
Italy Mexico Guatemala Georgia
Japan Oman Honduras Ghana
Kuwait Panama Iran Haiti
Macau Poland Iraq India
Netherlands Saint Lucia Jamaica Indonesia
New Zealand Saudi Arabia Jordan Kenya
Norway Seychelles Kazakhstan Kyrgystan
Portugal Slovakia Latvia Lao Dem. Rep.
Qatar South Africa Lithuania Liberia
Singapore Trinidad and Tobago Macedonia Madagascar
Slovenia Uruguay Morocco Malawi
Spain Venezuela Papua New Guinea Moldova
Sweden Peru Mongolia
Switzerland Philippines Mozambique
Taiwan Romania Nepal
United Arab Emirates Russia Nicaragua
United Kingdom Sri Lanka Niger
USA Suriname Nigeria
Syria Pakistan
Thailand Rwanda
Tonga Senegal
Tunisia Sierra Leone
Turkey Somalia
Sudan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Togo
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
Viet nam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Total: 34 28 39 50
Note: World Bank classification of countries by income level in 2001.
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